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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
_____________ 
 
No. 18-1336 
_____________ 
 
EVANGELIA MINTO, 
         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 
          
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey  
 (D.C. Civ. Action No. 3:16-cv-07084) 
District Judge: Hon. Anne E. Thompson  
 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 15, 2018 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., BIBAS and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: March 14, 2019) 
 
 
_____________ 
 
OPINION* 
_____________ 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
Ms. Evangelia Minto appeals from the District Court’s order granting summary 
judgment in favor of the United States Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) and its 
order denying her cross-motion for summary judgment.  For the following reasons, we 
will affirm. 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
This case arises out of a surgical procedure Ms. Minto had for a spinal injury, and 
the subsequent refusal to cover the insurance claim for said surgery by a federally-
contracted insurance carrier.  The District Court found that Ms. Minto was insured by her 
husband’s health insurance plan with the National Association of Letter Carriers 
(“NALC”) through Federal Employee Health Benefits (“FEHB”).  App. 4.  All FEHB 
carriers must provide services that OPM finds an individual is entitled to under the terms 
of his or her plan.  Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 8902(j).  Ms. Minto’s plan through NALC (“the Plan”) 
provided coverage for only “medically necessary” services, medications, and procedures.  
App. 177–78.  The Plan defines medical necessity as services or treatments that NALC 
determines: 
Are appropriate to diagnose or treat your condition, illness, or injury; [] Are 
consistent with standards of good medical practice in the United States; [] Are not 
primarily for the personal comfort or convenience of you, your family or your 
provider; [] Are not related to your scholastic education or vocational training. . . . 
 
App. 182.  The Plan brochure expressly notes that medical necessity is not guaranteed by 
the fact that a medical provider has “prescribed, recommended, or approved” a particular 
course of treatment or service.  App. 183.  The plan also provides NALC with the right to 
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pursue independent medical review of an insurance claim to determine whether the 
particular treatment or procedure meets the standards and requirements of the Plan.  App. 
181.    
 After two undisputed medically necessary procedures to fuse her C4–6 vertebrae 
and foster bone growth between the C6 and C7 vertebrae in 2008 and 2013, Ms. Minto 
sought a second opinion from Steven Paragioudakis, M.D. (“Dr. Paragioudakis”).  App. 
78.  After examining Ms. Minto on October 13, 2014, Dr. Paragioudakis’s written 
assessment noted “pseudoarthrosis[1] with instability at C6–7 causing severe neck pain 
and radiculopathy.”  App. 81.  After performing tests, Dr. Paragioudakis concluded that 
Ms. Minto had “pseudoarthrosis and adjacent level degeneration” in his preoperative 
notes on October 29th.  App. 93.  He also recorded in his notes that she would “undergo 
an anterior cervical revision with removal of hardware at C4–6 and instrumented fusion 
at C3–4, C6–7.”  App. 93–94.  Dr. Paragioudakis performed Ms. Minto’s surgery on 
October 31, 2014, and composed a postoperative report that documented pseudoarthrosis 
as one of Ms. Minto’s preoperative diagnoses.  App. 96. 
On February 4, 2015, NALC acknowledged the insurance claims submitted for 
Ms. Minto’s third surgery.  NALC, utilizing the review procedure set out in the Plan, 
contracted the medical review service Maximus Federal Services, Inc. (“Maximus”).  
Maximus has an independent board-certified orthopedic surgeon with no affiliation to 
Maximus, the providers, patient, or NALC, to perform these types of reviews and 
                                                 
1 Alternative spelling: pseudarthrosis. 
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determine whether the surgery was medically necessary to treat Ms. Minto’s condition.  
If medically necessary, the Plan would provide coverage.  App. 147.   
On February 25, 2015, Maximus sent NALC a completed audit report concluding 
that based on the independent medical reviewer’s finding the procedure was not 
medically necessary, having found no evidence of pseudoarthrosis within the information 
and documentation provided.2  App. 190–91.  NALC alerted Dr. Paragioudakis and his 
team that the procedure was not medically necessary under the Plan and would not be 
covered.  NALC also informed Dr. Paragioudakis that he could submit additional 
documentation.  App. 184.   
On April 18, 2015, Dr. Paragioudakis provided additional documentation, 
including a CAT scan, MRI report, and his post-operative report.  NALC sent the 
additional documentation to Maximus.  App. 7.  On June 26, 2015, Maximus sent a new 
audit report (“second audit report”) to NALC concluding once again that the surgery was 
not medically necessary given Ms. Minto’s condition.  App. 215–16.  Maximus’s 
medical reviewer cited to peer research and articles for this conclusion, discussing that 
motion analysis is a better indicator of pseudoarthrosis than CT scans (utilized by Dr. 
Paragioudakis) because it is less subjective and more predictive than imaging studies that 
fail to detect gross motion across fusion sites.  App. 215.  On July 13, 2015, NALC 
                                                 
2 When Dr. Paragioudakis originally submitted insurance claims to NALC on 
behalf of Ms. Minto’s surgery, he did not submit his preoperative or postoperative notes 
with his submission, nor did he provide any medical test results.  App. 190–91.   
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issued a letter with these results confirming its initial denial of coverage and informing 
Ms. Minto of her right to appeal NALC’s decision to OPM.  App. 72.   
On October 9, 2015, Ms. Minto appealed to OPM.  OPM requested an explanation 
from NALC and then sought an advisory opinion (“third audit report”) from an 
independent medical reviewer through the medical review service, IMEDICS.  App. 8.  
Immediately prior to the appeal on October 6, 2015, Dr. Paragioudakis submitted a letter 
to NALC attesting to the medical necessity of the procedure on Mrs. Minto’s behalf.  
App. 105.  Additionally, Dr. Paragioudakis dictated an addendum to the CAT scan report 
on October 8, 2015—almost a year after the original scan, report, and review—noting 
“findings are suspicious for pseudathrosis at C6–C7.”  App. 85.  OPM’s independent 
medical reviewer examined the record (which included the addendum to the CAT scan) 
and noted that there was a lack of quality literature and evidence finding surgery 
appropriate for the type of pain Ms. Minto had experienced.  The medical reviewer also 
found that there was no correlation between Ms. Minto’s physical exam findings or Ms.  
Minto’s CT scan with the dermatomal pattern of pain in her upper extremities.  App. 
499–500.   
OPM issued its final opinion letter on January 29, 2016, upholding NALC’s 
repeated finding that the procedure was not medically necessary under the terms of the 
Plan.  App 1–2.  Ms. Minto filed suit against OPM in federal district court seeking 
review of OPM’s final decision.  OPM and Ms. Minto opposed and cross-moved for 
summary judgment.  In support of Ms. Minto’s cross-motion for summary judgment, Dr. 
Paragioudakis submitted a declaration, which Ms. Minto asserts was only submitted to 
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“explain technical terms of complex subject matter involved in the agency action.”  Pls.’ 
Cross Mot. Summ. J. at 3 n.1; App 806–10.  The District Court declined to review the 
declaration because it found that the record OPM compiled was exceedingly complete.  
Further, there was “adequate information in federal case law to corroborate the essential 
medical terminology.”  App 15.  The District Court granted OPM’s summary judgment 
motion and denied Ms. Minto’s cross-motion.   
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de novo the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment in a case brought under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”) 5 U.S.C. § 701 et. seq., and apply the applicable standard of 
review to the underlying agency decision.  Pennsylvania Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. 
Sebelius, 674 F.3d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 2012).  The APA requires courts to set aside an 
agency decision that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law,” or that was conducted “without observance of procedure required 
by law.”  Id.  (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) & (D)).  Agency action may be arbitrary and 
capricious “if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to 
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an 
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so 
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency 
expertise.”  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).  “The scope 
of review under the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow, and a court is not to 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency.  Id.  When “applying the appropriate [APA] 
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standard of review to the agency decision” our review is limited to the administrative 
record.  Concerned Citizens Alliance, Inc. v. Slater, 176 F.3d 686, 693 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(internal quotations omitted).  “We must insure that, in reaching its decision, the agency 
examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for its action, 
including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” 
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.2d 372, 389–90 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting State 
Farm, 463 U.S. at 43).   
III. Analysis 
Ms. Minto argues that the District Court erred when it (1) refused to consider the 
declaration of her surgeon, Dr. Paragioudakis; and (2) denied her motion for summary 
judgment and granted summary judgment to OPM, concluding that OPM appropriately 
denied health insurance coverage for her surgery performed by Dr. Paragioudakis.  For 
the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to 
OPM and denial of Ms. Minto’s cross-motion seeking summary judgment. 
A. Exclusion of Dr. Paragioudakis’s Declaration 
Ms. Minto argues that the District Court erred by refusing to consider Dr. 
Paragioudakis’s declaration.  As a preliminary matter, “generally, judicial review of an 
agency action is limited to review of the administrative record.”  Animal Defense Council 
v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir. 1988).  Supplementation of the record is rare, and 
if it does occur, happens at the discovery stage.  The District Court declined to consider 
the declaration because judicial review of OPM’s decision is limited to the administrative 
record that was before the agency, and the District Court found the OPM record to be 
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exceedingly complete, with “adequate information in federal case law to corroborate the 
essential medical terminology.”  App. 15.   
Ms. Minto argues that she sought to supplement the administrative record with this 
declaration, not to “seek to offer new medical records” but rather “only to explain the 
medical terminology and references already in the record.”  Appellant’s Br. 11 (internal 
quotes omitted).  To support her argument that Dr. Paragioudakis’s declaration should be 
included, Ms. Minto cites to cases that rarely allow (and do not require) supplementation 
of the record in limited exceptions during discovery.  See, e.g., id. (“In addition, 
discovery may be permitted if supplementation of the record is necessary to explain 
technical terms or complex subject matter involved in the agency action.”).  Although 
such supplementation has been allowed during discovery, it has not been allowed in 
support of a cross-motion for summary judgment, where movants have alleged all 
necessary facts are in the record such that they should be granted judgment as a matter of 
law.  See, e.g., Hodel, 840 F.2d at 1436. (Noting only certain circumstances may justify 
expanding review beyond the record or permitting discovery). 
Assuming arguendo that a Court could allow supplementation of the record at the 
summary judgment stage like it does at the discovery stage, it is still not required to do 
so.  See Id. at 1436 (“[C]ertain circumstances may justify expanding review beyond the 
record or permitting discovery.” (emphasis added)).  Oddly, Ms. Minto undermines the 
need to include this declaration in her brief where she notes, “[N]othing in [Dr. 
Paragioudakis’s] declaration could be considered new information to the physicians that 
reviewed this matter for OPM.”  App. 13.  Although Ms. Minto argues that the 
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declaration merely clarifies medical terminology, in actuality it sets forth additional legal 
arguments, not purely medical definitions or even medical observations, in support of her 
case.  App. 807–09.   Ms. Minto is not allowed to include a substantive submission where 
her doctor attempts to supplement the record with both factual and seemingly legal 
arguments.  The declaration as such is beyond the purview of the administrative record to 
which the reviewing court is limited.  For all of the foregoing reasons, the District Court 
was well within its discretion to deny consideration of the declaration. 
B. Sufficiency of Evidence underlying OPM’s Decision to Deny Coverage 
Ms. Minto argues that the decision to deny health benefits coverage was not 
supported by the evidence before the Agency, and thus, the District Court erred in 
granting summary judgment.  Appellant’s Br. 19.  She contends that the “conclusions of 
three independent medical professionals within the administrative record” on which the 
District Court relies, cannot serve as sufficient evidence for its decision.  App. 17; 
Appellant’s Br. 19.  As the District Court noted, OPM’s decision need only establish a 
“rational connection between the facts found and the choice made” by the agency.  
Prometheus Radio Project, 373 F.2d at 389–90; App. 10.  The reviewing court is limited 
to “the administrative record [that was] already in existence before the agency, not some 
new record made initially in the reviewing court or post-hoc rationalizations made after 
the disputed action.”  Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Health & Human 
Servs., 730 F.3d 291, 305 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Rite Aid of Pa., Inc. v. Houstoun, 171 
F.3d 842, 851 (3d Cir. 1999)) (internal quotations omitted).  As OPM’s decision to deny 
coverage is rationally related to the facts presented in the record, OPM’s decision is 
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correct.  
Ms. Minto contends that the first audit report that resulted in denial of benefits was 
not based on medical opinions.  This is literally correct, as the first report notes, “there 
were no medical records provided prior to surgery or from follow-up services . . . .”  App. 
112.  Given what was provided to the independent medical reviewer, the reviewer 
reached the correct conclusion that “the need for revision surgery had not been 
established,” and provided Ms. Minto the opportunity to appeal.  App. 113. 
Ms. Minto then asserts that the second audit report discounted Dr. Paragioudakis’s 
direct observation of pseudoarthrosis and that the third audit report was incorrect in 
concluding that her complaints of pain were resolved prior to Dr. Paragioudakis’s 
surgery.3 Appellant’s Br. 16, 19.  There is no evidence that the second audit report 
ignored Dr. Paragioudakis’s observation of Ms. Minto’s condition on the operating table.  
As a preliminary matter, the record provides no statement by Dr. Main that his initial 
surgery had failed, nor any statement by any of the doctors that conducted her x-ray, 
CAT scan, or MRI that there was pseudoarthrosis present.  App. 10–12.  Although Dr. 
Paragioudakis’s observation of the condition on the operating table is relevant, it was 
dictated after he elected to conduct the surgery, and the condition had not been verified or 
supported by any other physician’s opinions or notes pre-surgery.  App. 12.  OPM’s 
                                                 
3 Additionally, Ms. Minto claims that the other independent reviews by OPM are 
unsubstantiated because the reviewer never examined Ms. Minto or her CT, MRI, or x-
ray images.  Appellant’s Br. 16.  However, these claims are without merit.  The report 
notes direct review of x-ray films, a CT scan, and an MRI by the independent medical 
reviewer, in addition to the review of medical notes by Ms. Minto’s treating physicians.  
App. 498.  
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independent medical reviewer analyzed the record that was before OPM when it rendered 
its decision to deny benefits, which took into consideration Dr. Paragioudakis’s 
observation.  Though Dr. Paragioudakis’s observation was considered, physical 
observation of a condition by Dr. Paragioudakis during surgery cannot serve to counter a 
significant amount of medical documentation and literature.  Given the medical literature 
available, the independent reviewer rationally determined that surgery was not necessary 
to treat Ms. Minto’s condition.  
Finally, Ms. Minto’s argument that the third audit report incorrectly stated her 
complaints of pain were resolved prior to Dr. Paragioudakis’s surgery is not supported by 
Dr. Paragioudakis’s notes or the report itself.  In his October 13, 2014 exam notes, Dr. 
Paragioudakis observed that “Ms. Minto was experiencing left shoulder and arm pain 
with weakness.”  App. 5, 78.  However, on the October 29, 2014 preoperative 
appointment, Dr. Paragioudakis concluded that both of Ms. Minto’s right and left upper 
extremities had full, painless range of motion.  App. 544.  Additionally, his assessment 
of Ms. Minto still noted “intractable neck pain.”  App. 543.  Ms. Minto’s claim that the 
third audit report noted she was free of pain is incorrect because the report made specific 
mention of Ms. Minto’s pain, and made the decision that her surgery was not medically 
necessary as surgery was not an accepted treatment for her pain.  See App. 498.  The third 
audit report establishes that “surgical care for axial neck pain alone is not recommended 
in the literature as there is a lack of high quality evidence.”  App. 499.   
IV. Conclusion 
Each of the three independent medical reviewer’s reports acknowledged review of 
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all available medical reports and documentation available at the time of each report.  
Each report also acknowledged all information on record in light of medical literature and 
peer reviewed publications.  App. 498.  OPM did not fail to consider an important aspect, 
nor did they offer an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence.  Dr. 
Paragioudakis’s visual observation of Ms. Minto’s alleged psuedoathrosis was taken into 
consideration by OPM’s medical reviewer, but his declaration explaining terminology 
was rightfully excluded from consideration as it was not in the administrative record in 
existence before the agency.  Ms. Minto’s pain was acknowledged by the third audit 
report, which did not suggest surgical care to alleviate it, based on peer-reviewed 
literature.  As there was a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice 
made,” there was sufficient evidence to support the grant of summary judgment to OPM.  
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.2d at 389–90 (internal citations omitted).  For 
the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment. 
 
